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Abstract
This paper studies the information-theoretic secrecy performance in large-scale cellular networks
based on a stochastic geometry framework. The locations of both base stations and mobile users are
modeled as independent two-dimensional Poisson point processes. We consider two important fea-
tures of cellular networks, namely, information exchange between base stations and cell association,
to characterize their impact on the achievable secrecy rate of an arbitrary downlink transmission with
a certain portion of the mobile users acting as potential eavesdroppers. In particular, tractable results
are presented under diverse assumptions on the availability of eavesdroppers’ location information
at the serving base station, which captures the benefit from the exchange of the location information
between base stations.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decades, we have witnessed the advancement of cellular communication
networks. Because of the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, an unauthorized receiver
located within the transmission range is capable of eavesdropping the unicast transmissions to-
wards legitimate users, and security is always a crucial issue in cellular systems. Traditionally,
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2most of security techniques in modern cellular standards, such as Wideband Code-Division
Multiple Access (WCDMA) and Long Term Evolution (LTE), involve means of encryption
algorithms in the upper layers of the protocol stacks [1], [2]. In contrast, the concept of
achieving information-theoretic security by protecting the physical layer of wireless networks
has attracted attention widely in the research community. Wyner proposed the wiretap channel
model and the notion of perfect secrecy for point-to-point communication in his pioneering
work [3], which was extended to broadcast channels with confidential messages by Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [4]. Based on these initial results, a positive secrecy capacity, defined as the
maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper is unable to obtain any information, can
be achieved if the intended receiver enjoys a better channel than the potential eavesdropper.
Unlike point-to-point scenarios, the communication between nodes in large-scale networks
strongly depends on the location distribution and the interactions between nodes. Based
on the assumption that legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are distributed randomly in the
space, the studies on the secure communications for large-scale wireless networks have been
carried out recently, from the information-theoretic viewpoint. Secrecy communication graphs
describing secure connectivity over a large-scale network with eavesdroppers present were
investigated in [5]–[8]. In particular, the statistical characterizations of in-degree and out-
degree under the security constraints were considered by Haenggi [5], Pinto et al. [6] and
Goel et al. [7]. By using the tools from percolation theory, the existence of a secrecy graph
was analyzed in [5], [8]. The results in [9] showed the improvements in the secure connectivity
by introducing directional antenna elements and eigen-beamforming. In order to derive the
network throughput, these works on connectivity were further extended for secrecy capacity
analysis. Specifically, the maximum achievable secrecy rate under the worst-case scenario
with colluding eavesdroppers was given in [10]. Scaling laws for secrecy capacity in large
networks have been investigated in [11]–[13]. Focusing on the transmission capacity of secure
communications, the throughput cost of achieving a certain level of security in an interference-
limited network was analyzed in [14], [15]. It should be noticed that all works mentioned
above were concentrated on ad hoc networks.
A. Approach and Contributions
In this work, we focus on the secrecy performance in large-scale cellular networks, con-
sidering cellular networks’ unique characteristics different from ad hoc networks: the carrier-
operated high-speed backhaul networks connecting individual base stations (BSs) and the
3core-network infrastructures, which provide us potential means of BS cooperation, such
as associating mobile users to the optimal BS with secrecy considerations and exchanging
information to guarantee better secure links.
Fortunately, modeling BSs to be randomly placed points in a plane and utilizing stochastic
geometry [16], [17] to analyze cellular networks have been used extensively as an analytical
tool for improving tractability [18]–[20]. Recent works [21]–[25] have shown that the network
models with BS locations drawn from a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) are as
accurate as the traditional grid models compared with the result of an practical network
deployment, and can provide more tractable analytical results which give pessimistic lower
bounds on coverage and throughput. For these reasons we adopt PPPs to model the locations
of BSs of the cellular networks in this paper.
The following scenario of secure communication in cellular networks is considered in this
work: confidential messages are prepared to be conveyed to a mobile user, while certain other
mobile users should not have the access to the messages and hence are treated as potential
eavesdroppers. The serving BS should ensure the messages delivered to the intended user
successfully while keeping perfect secrecy against all potential eavesdroppers. Considering
the fact that the cellular service area is divided into cells, each BS knows the location as
well as the identity of each user (i.e., whether the user is a potential eavesdropper or not) in
its own cell. The identity and location information of mobile users in the other cells can be
obtained by information exchange between BSs via the backhaul networks.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• First, our analytical results quantify the secrecy rate performance in large-scale cellular
networks. Specifically, tractable results are provided on the probability distribution of the
secrecy rate and hence the average secrecy rate achievable for a randomly located mobile
user in such a cellular network, under different assumptions on the cell association and
location information exchange between BSs as follows:
– Scenario-I: the serving BS fully acquires potential eavesdroppers’ location infor-
mation; the nearest BS from the intended user is chosen as the serving BS.
– Scenario-II: the serving BS fully acquires potential eavesdroppers’ location infor-
mation; the BS providing best secrecy performance at the intended user is chosen
as the serving BS.
– Scenario-III: the serving BS partially acquires potential eavesdroppers’ location
information; the nearest BS from the intended user is associated as the serving BS.
4• In addition, a unique feature of secure transmissions that the optimal BS is often not the
nearest BS is identified and analyzed in the work. Our results show that only marginal
gain can be obtained by optimally choosing the serving BS rather than associating to the
nearest one. In other words, keeping the nearest BS to be used for secure transmission
still achieves near-optimal secrecy performance, which is a very useful message to the
network designers.
• Finally, our analysis sheds light into the impact of the availability of eavesdroppers’
location information on the achievable secrecy rate. In particular, the secrecy perfor-
mances for the scenarios with no location information exchange and limited exchange
with neighboring cells are derived, which demonstrate the critical role of this kind
of BS cooperation. This result provides network designers with practical guidelines
in deciding on the necessary information exchange range, i.e., how many nearby BSs
should participate in the information exchange for achieving a certain level of secrecy
performance.
It should be noted that similar work to evaluate secrecy performance of large-scale cellular
networks was conducted in [26]; however, it mainly focused on the scaling behavior of the
eavesdropper’s density to allow full coverage over the entire network, without taking the
achievable secrecy rate into account. In contrast, we characterize the statistics of the secrecy
rate at an arbitrary mobile user under different cell association models and eavesdroppers’
location information exchanging assumptions mentioned above.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present the system
model and general assumptions in this work. Section III shows the main result of this
paper, in which we obtain simple tractable expressions for achievable secrecy rates under
different scenarios. Section IV provides numerical results and concluding remarks are given
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink scenario of a cellular network utilizing an orthogonal multiple
access technique and composed of a single class of BSs, macro BS for instance. We focus on
the performance achieved by a randomly chosen typical mobile user. The BSs are assumed
to be spatially distributed as a two-dimensional homogeneous PPP ΦBS of density λBS , and
all BSs have the same transmit power value PBS . An independent collection of mobile users,
located according to an independent homogeneous PPP ΦMS of density λMS, is assumed.
5We consider the process ΦMS ∪{0} obtained by adding a user at the origin of the coordinate
system. By Slivnyak’s Theorem [16], this user can be taken as the typical user, since adding
a user is identical to conditioning on a user at that location.
A. Signal Model
The standard power loss propagation model is used with path loss exponent α > 2. Hence,
the received power at the receiver xi from the transmitter xj is written as
Prx(xi, xj) = PBS‖xi − xj‖
−α. (1)
The noise power is assumed to be additive and constant with value σ2 for all users, but no
specific distribution is assumed.
In this work, we assume that there is no in-band interference at downlink receivers. This
assumption is achievable by a carefully planned frequency reuse pattern, where the interfering
BSs are far away to have the serving BS occupying some resource blocks exclusively in a
relatively large region, and the interference can be incorporated in the constant noise power.
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
We consider a scenario where confidential messages are prepared to be delivered to the
typical user, while certain individuals among other mobile users, treated as potential malicious
eavesdroppers (or called Eve for brevity) by the network, should be kept from accessing them.
We model a fraction of the other mobile users randomly chosen from ΦMS (the process
constructed by all other users except the typical user) as the eavesdroppers, i.e., a thinned
PPP with the density of λe, denoted by Φe.
Here we assume that each BS knows both the location and the identity (i.e., whether the
user is a potential eavesdropper or not) of each mobile user in its own cell, and the cell of
each BS is the Voronoi cell containing the BS, where the Voronoi tessellation is formed by
PPP ΦBS [16], as shown in Fig. 1. The identity and location information of mobile users
in the other Voronoi cells can be obtained by the information exchange between BSs via
backhaul networks.
Firstly, if we suppose the ideal case where the serving BS located at x knows the locations
of all eavesdroppers in the plane, which requires that the location and identity information
of all users is shared completely through the backhaul network, the maximum secrecy rate
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Poisson distributed BSs’ cell boundaries. Each user is associated with the nearest BS, and BSs
(represented by green squares) are distributed according to PPP. Dmin is defined as BS’s minimum distance to its cell
boundaries.
achievable at the typical mobile user is given by [6], [27], as
Rs = max
{
log2
(
1 +
Prx(0, x)
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(e
∗(x), x)
σ2
)
, 0
}
, (2)
where
e∗(x) = argmax
e∈Φe
Prx(e, x) = argmin
e∈Φe
‖e− x‖, (3)
i.e., e∗(x) is the location of the most detrimental eavesdropper, which is the nearest one from
the serving BS in this case.
Then, assuming limited information exchange between BSs, there will be regions in which
the eavesdroppers’ location information is unknown to the serving BS, which is denoted by
Θ ⊂ R2. When this happens, the serving BS assumes the worst case, i.e., eavesdroppers
can lie at any points in Θ. Then the achievable secrecy rate is still given by (2), but e∗(x)
should be
e∗(x) = arg max
e∈Φe∪Θ
Prx(e, x), (4)
where the detrimental eavesdropper is chosen from the union of the eavesdropper set Φe and
the unknown region Θ.
7It should be noticed that the randomness introduced by ΦBS and Φe makes the achievable
secrecy rate Rs at the typical user a random variable. Furthermore, the distribution of Rs is
mixed, i.e., Rs has a continuous distribution on (0,∞) and a discrete component at 0. For
Rs ∈ (0,∞), the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of Rs is given as
F¯Rs(R0) = P
(
log2
(
1 +
Prx(0, x)
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(e
∗(x), x)
σ2
)
> R0
)
, for R0 > 0. (5)
For the special case of Rs = 0, it has the probability P(Rs = 0) = 1 − F¯Rs(0), which
corresponds to the probability that the link to the typical user cannot support any positive
secrecy rate.
By assuming that the receivers of both the legitimate user and eavesdroppers operate in the
high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, i.e., Prx(0, x)/σ2 ≫ 1 and Prx(e∗(x), x)/σ2 ≫ 1,
we can obtain an approximation of Rs, denoted by Rˆs, i.e., Rˆs = max
{
log2
(
Prx(0, x)/σ
2
)
−
log2
(
Prx(e
∗(x), x)/σ2
)
, 0
}
, the CCDF of which is
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
( Prx(0, x)
Prx(e∗(x), x)
> β
)
= P
(
‖e∗(x)− x‖ > β1/α‖x‖
)
, for R0 > 0, (6)
where the threshold β is defined as β , 2R0 . In this work, we focus on high SNR scenarios
and use the above expression to obtain tractable results on the secrecy rate performance. The
obtained analytical results give approximations on the secrecy performance at finite SNR
values.
Furthermore, from the fact that the achievable secrecy rate Rs should always be non-
negative, we can easily reach the conclusion that the high SNR approximation F¯Rˆs(R0)
serves as an upper bound for the CCDF of Rs at finite SNR, i.e.,
F¯Rs(R0) = P
( σ2 + Prx(0, x)
σ2 + Prx(e∗(x), x)
> 2R0
)
6 P
( Prx(0, x)
Prx(e∗(x), x)
> 2R0
)
= F¯Rˆs(R0), for R0 > 0, (7)
where the two probability expressions are equal when R0 = 0. Therefore, some of our
analytical results on F¯Rˆs(R0) and E[Rˆs] under the high SNR assumption, including the exact
expressions and upper bounds, give valid upper bounds on the secrecy performances at finite
SNR values.
8III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide the main results on the probabilistic characteristics of the
achievable secrecy rates Rˆs and the average secrecy rates achievable E[Rˆs] under three major
scenarios, where different criterions to choose the serving BS are used and the serving BS
can fully or partially acquire the location information of the eavesdroppers, corresponding to
the different levels of BS cooperation introduced. It should be noticed that the BS cooperation
considered in this paper includes only exchanging the identity and location information of
the mobile users and selecting the appropriate BS to serve the typical user.
A. Scenario-I: Full Location Information; Nearest BS to Serve
We firstly assume that the location information of all eavesdroppers can be fully accessed
by the serving BS and employ the cell association model by confining mobile users to be
served by the nearest BS only. The location and identity information of mobile users in the
serving BS’s cell can be obtained easily, and other users’ information is supplied by other
BSs via the backhaul networks. Associating users to the nearest BS is commonly used in
related cellular modeling works [18], [21], and equivalently it means that a BS is associated
with the users in its Voronoi cell (formed by the PPP ΦBS).
Proposition 1. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the nearest BS and the
availability of full location information for all eavesdroppers, the CCDF of the achievable
secrecy rate obtained at the typical user is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) =
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2R0)/α
, for R0 > 0. (8)
Proof: Here we use x0 to denote the nearest BS from the origin, and we define ru as the
distance from the typical user to the nearest BS, namely, ru = ‖x0‖. The probability density
function (pdf) of ru has been provided in [28], as
fru(r) = 2piλBSr exp(−piλBSr
2). (9)
Due to the assumption that the serving BS knows all eavesdroppers’ locations in this scenario,
the most detrimental eavesdropper e∗(x0) for the BS at x0 should be the nearest one from
x0, as given in (3). We define the (closed) ball centered at p and of radius r as B(p, r), i.e.,
B(p, r) , {m ∈ R2, ‖m− p‖ 6 r}. Then the CCDF of the achievable secrecy rate Rˆs under
this scenario can be derived as
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
(
‖e∗(x0)− x0‖ > β
1/α‖x0‖
)
9=
∫ ∞
0
P
(
‖e∗(x0)− x0‖ > β
1/αru | ru = y
)
fru(y)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β1/αru) | ru = y
]
fru(y)dy
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β1/αy)
]
fru(y)dy
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0
exp(−piλeβ
2/αy2) · 2piλBSy exp(−piλBSy
2)dy
=
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2R0)/α
, (10)
where step (a) is derived based on the independence between Φe and ΦBS , and step (b)
follows the PPP’s void probability and pdf of ru given in (9). Through the deduction above,
the CCDF expression of the achievable secrecy rate can be obtained.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the nearest BS and
the availability of full location information for all eavesdroppers, the average secrecy rate
achievable at the typical user is provided by
E[Rˆs] =
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
. (11)
Proof: Based on the CCDF expression given in Proposition 1, the average secrecy rate
achievable at the typical user can be obtained by integrating (8) from 0 to ∞, i.e.,
E[Rˆs] =
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
dt
(a)
=
[
1
ln(22/α)
· ln
(
exp
[
ln(22/α)t
]
1 + λe
λBS
· exp
[
ln(22/α)t
])]∞
0
=
α
2 ln 2
ln
( 1
λe/λBS
)
−
α
2 ln 2
ln
( 1
1 + λe/λBS
)
=
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
, (12)
where step (a) follows the indefinite integral result for the form of the integrand herein,
which can be found in [29].
B. Scenario-II: Full Location Information; Optimal BS to Serve
Next, we still keep the assumption that the serving BS has all eavesdroppers’ location
information, which can be achieved by an ideal information exchange between BSs; however,
in this scenario, we assume that all BSs can act as candidates to serve the typical user.
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This scenario provides us the maximum achievable secrecy rate from the information-
theoretic point of view, which tells the network designer the ultimate secrecy performance
the cellular network can offer and can be viewed as the optimal BS cooperation scheme
considered in this paper. Obviously, to obtain the optimal secrecy performance, the BS
achieving the maximum secrecy rate should be selected. By studying the secrecy performance
with the optimal cell association, we are able to quantify the gap between the secrecy
performances provided by the optimal BS and the nearest BS.
Based upon these assumptions, the achievable secrecy rate at the typical user becomes
Rˆs = max
{
max
x∈ΦBS
{
log2
(Prx(0, x)
σ2
)
− log2
(Prx(e∗(x), x)
σ2
)}
, 0
}
, (13)
where e∗(x) is given by (3).
Proposition 2. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the optimal BS and the
availability of full location information for all eavesdroppers, an upper bound for the CCDF
of the achievable secrecy rate at the typical user is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) 6 1− exp
(
−
λBS
λe2(2R0)/α
)
, for R0 > 0, (14)
and a lower bound is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) >
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2R0)/α
, for R0 > 0. (15)
Proof: For a given BS (not necessarily the nearest BS) located at the position of x, its
achievable secrecy rate toward the origin’s typical user is larger than R0 if and only if there
is no eavesdroppers located within B(x, 2(R0/α)‖x‖). Hence, the achievable secrecy rate’s
cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be derived as
FRˆs(R0) = P(Rˆs 6 R0)
= P
[
All BSs can not provide secrecy rate larger than R0
]
= EΦe
[
EΦBS
[ ∏
x∈φBS
1
{
Φe
⋂
B(x, 2
R0
α ‖x‖) 6= 0
}]]
= EΦe
[
EΦBS
[ ∏
x∈φBS
[
1− 1
{
Φe
⋂
B(x, 2
R0
α ‖x‖) = 0
}]]]
(a)
= EΦe
[
exp
[
− λBS
∫
R2
1
{
Φe
⋂
B(x, 2
R0
α ‖x‖) = 0
}
dx
]]
> exp
[
− λBS
∫
R2
P
[
Φe
(
B(x, 2
R0
α ‖x‖)
)
= 0
]
dx
]
, (16)
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where R0 > 0, step (a) follows from the probability generating functional (PGFL) of the
PPP [16], and Jensen’s inequality gives the lower bound for FRˆs(R0) in the last step. The
part in the integral can be derived by using 2-D homogeneous PPP’s void probability [16],
i.e., P
[
Φe
(
B(x, 2(R0/α)‖x‖)
)
= 0
]
= exp(−piλe2
(2R0/α)‖x‖2), which can be substituted into
the integration in (16) to obtain the upper bound of the achievable secrecy rate’s CCDF in
(14) easily.
Then we turn to find the lower bound for the CCDF of the achievable secrecy rate. Here we
use Rˆs,nearest to denote the achievable secrecy rate where only the nearest BS is accessible,
which has been studied in Scenario-I. Since connecting to the nearest BS is always one of
the viable options if all BSs are reachable, we can have the usual stochastic order between
Rˆs,nearest in Scenario-I and Rˆs in the current scenario, i.e., P(Rˆs,nearest > R0) 6 P(Rˆs > R0)
or equivalently F¯Rˆs(R0) > F¯Rˆs,nearest(R0). Therefore, the conclusion in Proposition 1 provides
the lower bound in (15), which completes the proof.
Proposition 3. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the optimal BS and the
availability of full location information for all eavesdroppers, another upper bound for the
CCDF of the achievable secrecy rate at the typical user is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) 6 1− EVd
[
exp
(
−
4
(1 + 2R0/α)2
·
λBS
λe
· Vd
)]
, for R0 > 0, (17)
where the expectation is taken over the random variable Vd, the area of the typical Voronoi
cell of a PPP with the unitary density.
Proof: For the set of eavesdropper locations Φe, we can define a random set P , the
union of all points at which BS can provide the typical user (at the origin) a secrecy rate
Rˆs > R0, i.e.,
P=
{
x ∈ R2 : ‖e− x‖ > β1/α‖x‖, ∀e ∈ Φe
}
, (18)
which is based upon the assumption that the serving BS knows all eavesdroppers’ locations in
this scenario. Furthermore, we define C as the Voronoi cell generated by the process Φe∪{0},
the union of the eavesdroppers’ locations and the origin. Because of Slivnyak’s Theorem,
the Voronoi cell around the origin formed by Φe ∪ {0} has the same property as a randomly
chosen Voronoi cell formed by a PPP with density λe. The area measures of the random set
P and C are denoted by A(P) and A(C) respectively. An example of these random sets is
illustrated in Fig. 2, in which we can obtain a straightforward relationship between A(P)
12
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the relationship between P (the union of all points at which BS can provide the typical user a
secrecy rate Rˆs > log2(β), where β = 1.25, represented as the red region) and C (the Voronoi cell generated by the process
Φe ∪{0}), as defined in the proof of Proposition 3. The typical user denoted by a star is located at the origin. A realization
of eavesdroppers are scattered and denoted as circles.
and A(C) as
A(P) 6
4
(1 + β1/α)2
A(C), (19)
if β > 1 or equivalently R0 > 0.
The value
[
4/(1 + β1/α)2
]
A(C) is the area measure of the region enclosed by blue lines
in Fig. 2, which is the exact shape shrunk from C and has edges tangential to P’s edges.
Obviously, for a realization of the BS location ΦBS , the typical user can have a secrecy rate
larger than R0 if and only if there is at least a BS located in P , which makes the CCDF of
the secrecy rate Rˆs become
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
[
No BS exists in P
]
(a)
= 1− EP
[
exp
(
− λBSA(P)
)]
6 1− EP
[
exp
(
−
4λBS
(1 + β1/α)2
A(C)
)]
= 1− EVd
[
exp
(
−
4
(1 + β1/α)2
·
λBS
λe
· Vd
)]
, (20)
where the expectation in step (a) is taken over the random set P .
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Remark: It can be observed that the upper bound obtained in Proposition 3 depends on
the statistic characteristics of Voronoi cell’s area. It provides us an accurate approximation
for small positive Rˆs values and complements the upper bound result in Proposition 2.
Particularly, for the special case of R0 = 0, the region P turns out to be the Voronoi cell C,
thus making the CCDF upper bound become the exact result, i.e.,
F¯Rˆs(0) = 1− EVd
[
exp
(
−
λBS
λe
Vd
)]
, (21)
and the expression in this extreme case is consistent with the secrecy coverage probability
provided in [26]. For high value of R0, however, the area difference between A(P) and[
4/(1 + β1/α)2
]
A(C) increases, which makes the approximation in (19) become imprecise.
This can explain the numerical results we will observe later in Fig. 5, i.e., the discrepancy
between the upper bound given by Proposition 3 and the simulation result for R0 = 5.
Although there is no known closed form expression of Vd’s pdf [30], some accurate
estimates of this distribution were produced in [31], [32]. For instance, a simple gamma
distribution was used to fit the pdf of Vd derived from Monte Carlo simulations in [32], i.e.,
fVd(x) ≈ b
qxq−1 exp(−bx)/Γ(q), (22)
where q = 3.61, b = 3.61 and Γ(x) =
∫∞
0
tx−1e−tdt is the standard gamma function. By
substituting this estimate into (17) and simplifying the integral, we can obtain
F¯Rˆs(R0) ≈ 1−
bq(
b+ 4
(1+2R0/α)2
· λBS
λe
)q , for R0 > 0. (23)
After giving the bounds for Rˆs’s CCDF, we will focus on the average secrecy rate achiev-
able for a randomly located user.
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the optimal BS and the
availability of full location information for all eavesdroppers, an upper bound of the average
secrecy rate achievable at the typical user is provided by
E[Rˆs] 6
α
2 ln 2
·
[
γ + ln
(λBS
λe
)
+ E1
(λBS
λe
)]
, (24)
and a lower bound is provided by
E[Rˆs] >
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
, (25)
where E1(x) =
∫∞
x
exp(−t)1
t
dt is the exponential integral and γ is the Euler-Mascheroni
constant.
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Proof: Based on the CCDF bounds given in Proposition 2, the upper and lower bound
of the average secrecy rate achievable at the typical user can be obtained by integrating (14)
and (15) from 0 to ∞. Specifically, the upper bound can be derived as
E[Rˆs] 6
∫ ∞
0
[
1− exp
(
−
λBS
λe2(2t)/α
)]
dt
(a)
=
1
ln(22/α)
∫ λBS
λe
0
1− exp(−v)
v
dv, (26)
where step (a) is derived by employing a change of variables v = λBS/(λe2(2t)/α). We use
the Taylor series expansion of exp(−v), and the integrand in (26) becomes
1− exp(−v)
v
=
∞∑
k=1
(−v)k−1
k!
. (27)
Then by integrating both sides of the equation (27) and performing simple mathematical
operations, we can obtain the relationship∫ λBS
λe
0
1− exp(−v)
v
dv =
∫ λBS
λe
0
∞∑
k=1
(−v)k−1
k!
dv
=
∞∑
k=1
∫ λBS
λe
0
(−v)k−1
k!
dv
= −
∞∑
k=1
(−λBS
λe
)k
k · k!
. (28)
Since the exponential integral can be expressed as E1(x) = −γ − ln(x) +
∑∞
k=1
(−1)k+1xk
k·k!
when x > 0 [33], the above integral can be derived as∫ λBS
λe
0
1− exp(−v)
v
dv = γ + ln
(
λBS
λe
)
+ E1
(
λBS
λe
)
. (29)
Plugging (29) into (26) gives the upper bound of the average secrecy rate in (24).
On the other hand, following the same procedure as the one to prove Corollary 1, the
lower bound of average secrecy rate can be obtained, which completes the proof.
An alternative upper bound of the average secrecy rate achievable can be derived based
upon Proposition 3, and the corresponding performance will also be shown in Section IV.
It should be noticed that the optimal BS mentioned here is not necessarily the nearest
BS, since it is possible that other BSs can provide higher secrecy rate than the nearest BS.
Taking the case illustrated in Fig. 3 for example, the typical user’s nearest BS is BS-A, which,
however, is hardly capable of providing a secure connection due to its excellent connection
to the eavesdropper nearby. Alternatively, choosing BS-B to serve can provide a certain level
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Voronoi Cell Boundary 
Excellent Link
Good Link
Good Link
Weak Link
Fig. 3. An example where the BS providing maximum achievable secrecy rate is not the nearest BS. The typical user’s
nearest BS is BS-A, which however cannot provide a positive secrecy rate due to its excellent link to the eavesdropper.
BS-B, on the other hand, can provide a secrecy connection since there is no eavesdroppers nearby.
secrecy rate if the typical user’s channel quality to BS-B is better than the channel to the
eavesdropper.
By comparing the secrecy performance in Scenario-I (the typical user served by the nearest
BS) with this scenario (the typical user served by the best BS), we will be able to see the
benefit from optimally choosing the serving BS to provide the secure downlink transmission.
The numerical illustrations will be provided in Section IV.
C. Scenario-III: Limited Location Information; Nearest BS to Serve
Here we still assume the same cell association model as Scenario-I, i.e., mobile users are
served by the nearest BS, nevertheless only limited users’ location and identity information is
known to the serving BS. Considering the backhaul bandwidth cost in practice and the core-
network implementation complexity for BS cooperation, the scenarios where the location and
identity information is only exchanged with neighboring cells or even no exchange allowed
at all are analyzed in this section.
1) No location and identity information exchange: Firstly, we assume that no location and
identity information exchange allowed between BSs, which means that the serving BS only
knows the intracell users’ location and identity information. As mentioned in section II-B, the
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unknown region outside the serving cell leads to the worst case assumption that eavesdroppers
lie on the serving BS’s cell boundaries and limit the achievable secrecy rate.
Before coming to this scenario’s secrecy performance, we firstly define the minimum
distance from PPP’s each point to its own cell boundaries, denoted as Dmin. In Fig. 1, for
instant, the Dmin of three BSs are illustrated. In the cell tessellation formed by BS PPP with
density λBS , we can simply use the void probability of a PPP to derive
P (Dmin > r) = P
[
No BS closer than 2r
]
= e−piλBS(2r)
2
. (30)
Therefore, the CDF is FDmin(r) = P (Dmin 6 r) = 1−e−piλBS(2r)
2
and the pdf can be found as
fDmin(r) =
dFDmin(r)
dr
= 8piλBSr exp(−4piλBSr
2). (31)
Proposition 4. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the nearest BS and
only intracell eavesdroppers’ location information available, a lower bound for the CCDF
of the achievable secrecy rate obtained at the typical user is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) >
1
1 + ( λe
λBS
+ 4) · 2(2R0)/α
, for R0 > 0. (32)
Proof: Based on the available intracell eavesdroppers’ location information and the
assumption that the typical user is served by the nearest BS at x0, (6) becomes
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
(
‖e∗(x0)− x0‖ > β
1/α‖x0‖
)
(a)
= P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru); ru < β
− 1
αDmin
]
=
∫ ∞
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru);Dmin > β
1
α ru | ru = y
]
fru(y)dy, (33)
where step (a) is based on the fact that eavesdroppers are assumed to be lied in the cell
boundaries for the worst case. The probability expression herein can be further derived as
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru);Dmin > β
1
α ru | ru = y
]
(b)
= P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
αy)
]
· P
(
Dmin > β
1
αy | ru = y
)
> P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
αy)
]
· P
(
Dmin > β
1
αy
)
= exp
(
− piλe(β
1
αy)2
) ∫ ∞
β
1
α y
fDmin(z)dz
= exp
(
− pi(λe + 4λBS)β
2
αy2
)
, (34)
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where the independence between Φe and ΦBS is used to separate the two probability ex-
pressions in step (b), and the former part is only dependent on the density of eavesdroppers
λe and the ball’s area piβ2/αy2, but independent of x0. It should be noticed that the value
of ru has an impact on the distribution of Dmin, and we need to use fDmin|ru(· | ·) to
derive P(Dmin > β
1
α y | ru = y) in step (b). Because the tractable result of fDmin|ru(· | ·)
is not available, we obtain a lower bound (also served as a tractable approximation) ex-
pression by ignoring the impact of ru on the distribution of Dmin, due to the fact that
P(Dmin > x | ru = y) > P (Dmin > x). The lower bound by replacing distribution fDmin(·)
can provide a good approximation, which will be demonstrated by the numerical comparisons
in Section IV.
By substituting (34) and the pdf of ru given in (9) into (33), the lower bound expression
(32) can be obtained, which completes the proof.
Remark: When λe ≫ λBS , the impact of cell boundaries on the secrecy rate becomes
negligible, since almost surely an eavesdropper exists inside the ball B(x0, Dmin) and limits
the achievable secrecy rate, then making (32) become (8).
Corollary 3. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the nearest BS and only
intracell eavesdroppers’ location information available, a lower bound of the average secrecy
rate achievable at the typical user is provided by
E[Rˆs] >
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(5λBS + λe
4λBS + λe
)
. (35)
Proof: The lower bound of the average secrecy rate E[Rˆs] can be derived by integrating
(32) from 0 to ∞. Since the integrand in this integral has the similar form as (8), the same
deduction procedure can be performed to obtain this lower bound.
Remark: Under the condition of mobile users camping on the nearest BS, Scenario-I and
this case can be regarded as two extremes: in the former scenario, the location information of
all eavesdroppers is shared among BSs, while no location and identity information exchange
is allowed in the latter one. By comparing the expressions of (11) with (35), it is easy
to conclude that the latter case’s average secrecy rate achievable increases with λBS/λe
much slower than the counterpart in Scenario-I. This trend, which will be given numerically
in following Section IV, demonstrates the impact of the location and identity information
exchange between BSs.
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2) Location and identity information exchange limited with neighboring cells only: In
order to further characterize how the availability of the location and identity information
affects the secrecy performance, we will investigate the secrecy rate for the case where the
location information and identity exchange is restricted to the serving BS’s neighboring cells
only.
Given certain neighboring BSs participating in the information exchange with the serving
BS, the region outside the cells covered by these BSs is the unknown region. By considering
the worst case scenario that the eavesdroppers can be located anywhere inside the unknown
region, the secrecy performance is limited by the minimum distance from the unknown region
to the serving BS. As long as the minimum distance is the same, the secrecy performance stays
the same regardless of the shape of the unknown region, which means that the consideration
of a disk-shape known region does not lose the generality of the result on secrecy rates.
Therefore, we apply the following model to represent the known and unknown regions: only
the location information of the eavesdroppers with distances less than D0 from the serving
BS is available to it, i.e., the eavesdroppers outside the region B(x,D0) are unknown to a
BS at x. The value D0 is called detection radius in our analysis.
From a network design perspective, a larger D0 represents information exchanging feasible
with BSs farther away, and in other words, a larger D0 means that more BSs participate in
the information exchange with the serving BS. This scenario provides limited information
exchange, which can be regarded as an intermediate case between Scenario-II and Scenario-
III(1), and reflects practical considerations, such as the limited bandwidth of the backhaul
network and the complexity introduced by extensive information sharing in the practical
implementation. By investigating how the achievable secrecy rate changes with D0, one can
obtain insights on the improvement of the secrecy performance as more BSs participate in
the information exchange process.
Proposition 5. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the nearest BS and the
detection radius is D0, the CCDF of the achievable secrecy rate obtained at the typical user
is given by
F¯Rˆs(R0) =
(
1− exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2R0
α )D0
2
])
·
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2R0)/α
, for R0 > 0. (36)
Proof: Based on the available location information of eavesdroppers with distances less
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than D0 and the typical user served by the nearest BS at x0, (6) can be derived as
F¯Rˆs(R0) = P
(
‖e∗(x0)− x0‖ > β
1/α‖x0‖
)
= P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru); ru < β
− 1
αD0
]
=
∫ β− 1αD0
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
α ru) | ru = y
]
fru(y)dy
(a)
=
∫ β− 1αD0
0
P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
αy)
]
fru(y)dy
(b)
=
∫ 2−R0α D0
0
2piλBSy · exp(−piλe2
2R0
α y2 − piλBSy
2)dy
=
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2R0)/α
·
(
1− exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
−
2R0
α )D0
2
])
, (37)
where step (a) follows the independence between Φe and ΦBS , and step (b) is derived based
on the void probability of PPP and the pdf of ru. It should be noticed that the probability
expression P
[
No Eve in B(x0, β
1
αy)
]
is only dependent on the density of eavesdroppers λe
and the ball’s area piβ2/αy2, but independent of x0. The integration from 0 to 2−
R0
α D0 gives
the result which completes the proof.
Remark: As expected, the general trend can be understood as follows: when detection
radius D0 decreases, the location information of eavesdroppers surrounding the serving BS
reduces, which makes a lower probability to maintain the secrecy rate R0. As we increase
D0 to infinity, the condition turns to be the same as Scenario-I, thus making (36) become (8).
Corollary 4. Under the conditions of mobile users being served by the nearest BS and the
detection radius is D0, the average secrecy rate achievable at the typical user is provided by
E[Rˆs] =
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
−
α
2 ln 2
·
[
E1
(
piλeD
2
0
)
−E1
(
pi(λe + λBS)D
2
0
)]
. (38)
Proof: Based on the CCDF expression given in Proposition 5, the average secrecy rate
achievable at the typical user can be provided by integrating (36) from 0 to ∞, i.e.,
E[Rˆs] =
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
·
(
1− exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
− 2t
α )D20
])
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
dt−
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− pi(λe + λBS2
− 2t
α )D20
]
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
dt
(a)
=
α
2 ln 2
· ln
(λBS + λe
λe
)
−
exp(−piλeD
2
0)
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− piλBSD
2
0 · 2
− 2t
α
]
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
dt, (39)
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where the deduction of the former part in step (a) utilizes the result solved in Corollary 1,
and then we will focus on the integral in its latter part, i.e.,
exp(−piλeD
2
0)
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− piλBSD
2
0 · 2
− 2t
α
]
1 + λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
dt
(b)
= exp(−piλeD
2
0)
∫ ∞
λe
λBS
exp(−piλeD
2
0v
−1)
1 + v
·
α
2v ln 2
dv
(c)
=
α
2 ln 2
∫ pi(λBS+λe)D20
piλeD20
1
s exp(s)
ds
=
α
2 ln 2
[
E1
(
piλeD
2
0
)
− E1
(
pi(λe + λBS)D
2
0
)]
, (40)
where step (b) and step (c) are obtained by employing changes of variables v = λe
λBS
· 2(2t)/α
and s = piλeD
2
0
v
+piλeD
2
0 respectively, and the last step can be derived by using the definition
of the exponential integral. Plugging (40) into (39) gives the desired result in (38), which
completes the proof.
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we present numerical results on the achievable secrecy rate for all three
major scenarios respectively. Here we define the value SNR as the received SNR from the
serving BS at the distance r = 1, i.e., SNR = PBS/σ2. All simulation results are conducted
under a high SNR condition, i.e., SNR = 20dB, and unitary BS density, i.e., λBS = 1, to
compare with our analysis for the purpose of model validation.
Firstly, for each curve in Fig. 4, we show the average secrecy rates achievable at the typical
user in Scenario-I, for both path loss exponents of α = 4 and α = 2.5. As can be seen in
this figure, the curves representing the analytical expression (11) in Corollary 1 match the
simulated results for all conditions.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 demonstrate the results of Scenario-II, the optimal case where all mobile
users’ location and identity information is completely known and the optimal BS is chosen
to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. Fig. 5 shows the typical user’s secure link coverage
probability with the threshold R0 = 0 or R0 = 5 to claim outage. Note that the upper bound in
Proposition 3 converges to the exact coverage probability in the special case of R0 = 0, which
can be observed from the fact that the curves representing the approximation (23) based on
Proposition 3 match the simulated results in Fig. 5. However, this approximation is not precise
for large values of R0, e.g., R0 = 5 and the analytical reason for this inaccuracy is explained
in remark after Proposition 3. On the other hand, the lower bound and the upper bound
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Fig. 4. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the eavesdropper density λe for Scenario-I (full location information;
nearest BS to serve). Simulation and tractable analytical results are shown for different path loss exponents α.
in Proposition 2 tend to give more accurate approximations of the exact secrecy coverage
probability for large values of R0, which can be regarded as a complementary property to
offset the limitation of the upper bound in Proposition 3 mentioned above. From the results
shown in Fig. 6, the tractable upper and lower bounds of the achievable secrecy rates in
Corollary 2 are also reasonably accurate. Furthermore, the approximations for the average
secrecy rates achievable based on Proposition 3 are also demonstrated in Fig. 6 and turn out to
be inaccurate due to Proposition 3’s imprecise estimate for large R0. The achievable secrecy
rate given in Scenario-II provides the maximum value over all the scenarios considered in
this paper.
By comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 6, it can be noted that picking the nearest BS to serve can
achieve a secrecy rate nearly as much as the optimal value. For example, the secrecy rate in
Scenario-I is approximately 1.9 for α = 4 and the eavesdroppers’ density λe = 1, compared
with around 2.1 for the optimal case in Scenario-II. In other words, there is only marginal
benefits from optimally choosing the serving BS instead of simply picking the nearest BS to
serve.
Fig. 7 shows the average secrecy rate achievable for Scenario-III(1), where no location
and identity information exchange is allowed and only intracell users’ location information
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Fig. 5. The secure coverage probability versus the eavesdropper density λe for Scenario-II (full location information;
optimal BS to serve). Simulation and tractable analytical results are shown for different thresholds R0 = 0 or 5 to claim
outage. Different path loss exponents are demonstrated: α = 4 (left) and α = 2.5 (right).
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Fig. 6. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the eavesdropper density λe for Scenario-II (full location information;
optimal BS to serve). Simulation and tractable analytical results are shown for different path loss exponents: α = 4 (left)
and α = 2.5 (right).
is known to the serving BS. Due to the shrinkage of the region where location information
is available, the secrecy performance is significantly degraded compared with the counterpart
in Fig. 4. For example, the average secrecy rate achievable is around 0.57 for α = 4 and
λe = 1, whereas the corresponding value can reach around 1.9 for Scenario-I. We also observe
a relatively slow drop in the average secrecy rate achievable as λe changes from 0.1 toward
1, due to its weak dependence on the density of eavesdroppers in this range of λe, which
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Fig. 7. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the eavesdropper density λe for Scenario-III(1) (no location information
exchange; nearest BS to serve). Simulation results and tractable lower bounds are shown for different path loss exponents
α.
suggests that the lack of location information outside the serving BS’s cell becomes the main
restrictive factor in determining the secrecy performance. On the other hand, as λe increases
from 1 to 10, the average secrecy rate achievable accelerates to drop since the eavesdropper
density is more influential. It can be shown that the tractable lower bound in (35) captures
the general trend of the curves and can be used as a tool to make a precise estimate.
Furthermore, by presenting the average secrecy rate achievable versus the detection radius
D0 in Fig. 8, we can see the importance of eavesdroppers’ location information on the
secrecy performance. In case of relatively small values of D0, any increase of the detection
radius brings remarkable benefit to the achievable secrecy rate. On the other hand, in case
of large D0, any further increase in the detection radius does not substantially impact the
secrecy rate, since the eavesdropper that limits the secrecy performance is usually located
not too far away from the serving BS and its distance is likely to be smaller than D0 when
D0 is sufficiently large. Take the curve with α = 4 and λe = 0.1 for instance, the secrecy
performance improves significantly as D0 is increased up to 2, and any further increase from
D0 = 2 has a limited effect. This performance trend over the range of detection radius
can be utilized to appropriately choose the number of neighboring BSs for the information
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Fig. 8. The average secrecy rate achievable versus the detection radius D0 for Scenario-III(2) (location information for
users with distances less than D0; nearest BS to serve). Simulation and tractable analytical results are shown for different
eavesdropper densities λe and different path loss exponents: α = 4 (left) and α = 2.5 (right).
exchange in order to achieve a good secrecy performance whilst taking the implementation
cost of such information exchange into consideration. It should be noticed that the slight
mismatches between simulation and tractable results in Fig. 4 and Fig. 8 come from the high
SNR assumption used in our analysis, and become almost invisible at SNR = 30dB (plots
omitted for brevity).
Another fact clearly shown from Fig. 6-8 is that better performance can be obtained for
larger values of path loss exponent α, e.g., the average secrecy rate achievable is higher
for α = 4 than the counterpart for α = 2.5. This is because the resultant larger path loss
from larger α indicates worse signal condition to both the eavesdroppers and the typical user,
whereas the former effect turns out to be more influential on the secrecy performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the secrecy performance of cellular networks considering cell as-
sociation and information exchange between BSs potentially provided by the carrier-operated
high-speed backhaul and core-networks. Using the stochastic geometry modeling of cellular
networks, tractable results to characterize the secrecy rate were obtained under different
assumptions on the cell association and location information exchange between BSs. The
simulation results validate the tractable expressions and approximations. From the analysis
in this paper, we identified the unique feature for secure transmissions that the optimal BS
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is often not the nearest BS. Nevertheless, our result shows that keeping the nearest BS to
be used for secure transmissions still achieves near-optimal secrecy performance. We also
considered the exchange of eavesdropper’s location information between BSs and studied
its impact on the secrecy rate performance. Our finding is that it is usually sufficient to
allow a small number of neighboring BSs to exchange the location information for achieving
close to maximum secrecy rate. Specifically, our analytical result provides network designers
practical guidelines to decide the necessary information exchange range, i.e., how many
nearby BSs should participate in the information exchange for achieving a certain level of
secrecy performance.
The result in this work applies to scenarios where a carefully planned frequency reuse
pattern is assumed, and the serving BS can occupy some resource blocks exclusively in a
relatively large region. In future cellular networks, however, interference will become an
important factor. Since the channel conditions of both legitimate users and eavesdroppers
will be degraded by introducing interference, the impact of the co-channel interference on
the secrecy performance of large-scale cellular network is still unknown. Another limitation
is that the BS cooperation considered in this paper is confined to cell association and location
information exchange. Coordinated multipoint (CoMP) transmission, as an emerging BS
cooperation technique in future cellular networks, can be potentially utilized, and its benefit
on the secrecy performance is an interesting problem to investigate.
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